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Thornton
Karl Friston
The Wellcome Trust Centre for Neuroimaging, University College London, Queen Square, London, WC1N 3BG, UKChris Thornton [1] poses some simple but key questions
about the free-energy principle reviewed in [2]. These
puzzles have simple and clear answers:
Puzzle: ‘‘A generative model of causal structure in the
environment is [then] obtained, on which basis the agent is
able to infer the ‘causes of sensory samples’ [ibid. p. 294].
What is unclear is how this mechanism would function
where sensory samples are ambiguous’’ [1].
Answer: One of the main motivations for the free-
energy principle is its appeal to [approximate] Bayesian
inference where ambiguities are resolved by priors [3].
Priors are mandated by the (ill-posed) problems created
by ambiguity and empirical priors are an integral part of
Open access under CC BY license.hierarchical inference [2,Box 3]. This is not theoretical
hand waving; in biophysics, the free-energy formulation
is used routinely to solve difficult ill-posed inverse pro-
blems (e.g. [4]).
Puzzle: ‘‘On the face of it, no particular stand is taken
on emergence of the structures that mediate minimization.
But looking at the definition of free-energy, we find a
significant role being played by the variable W. It is values
of this variable that encapsulate the brain’s representation
of ‘environmental causes’’’ [1].
Answer: The representations are not environmental
causes W but the sufficient statistics m of the brain’s recog-
nition density q(W;m); these include synaptic activity andf free-energy can be considered as optimizing the state (perception), configuration
type (evolution) of an agent. Here, F ðs˜;mðiÞjmðiÞÞ is the free-energy of the sensory
class m. The states mmx,mg,mu correspond to synaptic activity, gain and strength,
Update Trends in Cognitive Sciences Vol.14 No.2efficacy [2]. The implicit optimization of neuronal connec-
tions (i.e. perceptual learning) leads to hierarchical brain
structures (models) that recapitulate causal structure in the
sensorium.This optimizationprocess can ‘prune’ the formor
structure of the model (cf., synaptic pruning [5]) and is used
routinely in model optimization (e.g. automatic relevance
determination [6]). Furthermore, one could regard natural
selection as optimizing the structural form of models at an
evolutionary scale, through minimizing free-energy (where
it is called free-fitness [7]). In a statistical setting, free-
energy bounds on model evidence are used routinely in
Bayesian model selection (where the log model evidence
is negative surprise, e.g. [8];) (Figure 1).
Puzzle: ‘‘With the framework providing no principle for
deciding the range of W, the brain’s representation of the
conditional density is inevitably a ‘slightly mysterious
construct’’’ [1].
Answer: The range of W (the values it can take) is
specifiedby the formof the (generative)model and thepriors
it entails.For example, the equation inBox2 [2] specifies the
range of hidden states in theworld x(i)Wwith the range of a
function, for example a neuronal activation function. The
‘slightly mysterious’ aspect of the recognition density is not
its form (nor the implicit range of causes that are
represented) but the fact that it is induced by the brain’s
physical states (which encode the recognition density).
Puzzle: ‘‘It is unclear how introduction of the ‘free-
energy’ concept, specifically, adds explanatory content. . .it
is minimization of surprise that is explanatorily salient’’ [1].
Answer: The explanatory advance furnished by free-
energy is fundamental: it provides a means to minimizeCorresponding author: Over, D. (david.over@durham.ac.uk).surprise. This is because surprise cannot bequantifiedbyan
agent, whereas free-energy can. Again, this is not abstract
hand waving; the free-energy bound on surprise (or log-
evidence for a model) plays an essential role in physics [9],
machine learning [10] and statistics [11] for this reason.
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What Intelligence Tests Miss: The Psychology of Rational Thought by Keith Stanovich, Yale University Press, 2009. £16.00 (308 pp.)
ISBN 978-0-300-12385-2.
David Over
Psychology Department, Durham University, Durham City DH1 3LE, UKDespite a long tradition of research in
both fields, the psychological study of
Stanovich relies on the standard view in cognitive
science that rationality should be defined in two relatedintelligence and its tests has not been well
integrated with the psychological study of
rationality. Keith Stanovich’s well-writ-
ten and accessible book does integrate
these studies and should, for that reason
alone, have a highly beneficial impact on
both.
Stanovich argues that standard intelligence tests miss
the trait than can be of even greater value than relatively
high intelligence: rationality. Although these tests
measure something of value, it is not rationality: ration-
ality is usually at best modestly correlated with scores on
intelligence tests.ways. It can refer, most fundamentally, to instrumental
rationality, which is the ability to achieve one’s goals or
(more technically) maximize expected utility. It can also
refer to epistemic rationality: the capacity to acquire the
well-justified beliefs that are usually necessary for goal
achievement. Stanovich establishes, both informally and
on the basis of an extensive empirical literature, that
there is a clear distinction between rationality so defined
and intelligence. Intelligence can help to solve some
problems about rational belief or action, but is of little
help in other cases. An example is myside bias, the
tendency to evaluate evidence from an egocentric point
of view. Stanovich and his collaborator Richard West
found no correlation between the magnitude of this bias
and intelligence.55
